based argument in “Autonomy, toleration, and the harm principle. excluding it is one of the goals of Joseph Raz’s autonomy-based argument in “Autonomy. Joseph Raz aligns practices with harms in a different way w person who fails to See “Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle,” in Issue. Philosophy, ed. First, it is essential for the concept of toleration that the tolerated beliefs .. Raz, J. , , “Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle,” in S.
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The Limits of Law
Less serious forms of coercion disrespect persons and express contempt for them. This has often been seen as a skeptical argument, yet this is not what Bayle intended; what he suggested, rather, was that toleratiob truths of religion are of a different epistemological character than truths arrived at by the use of reason alone.
To tolerate means to insult. In State v Brown for example, the assumed facts were that the defendant beat his wife when she drank alcohol, doing so at her prior request, as she thought this would be the most effective way to cure her severe alcoholism. If abortion is murder that would. Perhaps what this shows is that one of the key functions of the harm principle needs to be restricted in scope.
Toleration (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
But why is this? Please log in to set a read status Setting a reading intention helps you organise your reading. Having observed the results of their efforts, the legal officials may conclude that it would have been better to have used other means or maybe even to have done nothing, to have tolerated the former level of harm, since their means of putting it to an end did not solve the problem aimed at, but exacerbated it.
In more recent times Joel Feinberg has sought to vindicate a broadly Millian understanding of the limits of the law. Classical, Early, and Medieval Prose and Writers: Earlier another strand of thinking about the limits of the law, that the law must remain neutral between different understandings of the nature of the good, was briefly noted.
Mill offers three main arguments for toleration. I shall suggest that the central tension is over the recourse that a state should have to moral premises for which truth is claimed.
The harm principle permits us to use coercion to prevent harm. Principled limits beyond means-ends or practical limits are elusive and hard to justify. And much of this disagreement cannot simply be blamed on the bloody-mindedness of some or on those biased in favour of themselves, their families or groups. In Devlin’s view a society is in part constituted by its morality and it therefore has a right to defend itself against any attack on that morality. Interference with liberty of action, especially by the use of power or coercion, required a special sort of justification: The image of the tree surgeon comes to mind.
The discussion so far implies that toleration is a normatively dependent concept. Hence the argument presupposes a specific thesis about the good life—i.
But the assumed justice of the conviction can be explained satisfactorily neither by recourse to the principle of autonomy as the victim consented to the beatingsnor to the principle of welfare if this really was the best way to end the blight that alcoholism had become on Mrs Brown’s life it would arguably enhance her welfare. I think, therefore, that it is not possible to set theoretical limits to the power of the State to legislate against immorality.
Autonomy, toleration and the harm principle | University of St Andrews
tolfration But given some other things that Mill says about it, it is initially puzzling why he should think that utility tolegation any support to the harm principle. Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that there are two boundaries involved in this interpretation of the concept of toleration: Classical, Early, and Medieval World History: A state may also need to consider in some contexts the psychology of its citizens.
If one assumes for the sake of argument that gambling for non-trivial amounts is a worthless option and that some who pursue this option will do so to the detriment of what is valuable and what they care about most, their auonomy, jobs and long-term hobbies. Princeton University Press, — I actually suspect, to be sure, that any attempt to coerce gambling along these lines would have many negative side-effects and for this reason should not be pursued in practice, but this would largely be due to practical and means-ends limits rather than any matter of principle.
And it is no objection to say that the view is a minority one. One may doubt whether such a way principld life will necessarily be subjectively more fulfilling or objectively more valuable than one adopted in a more traditional way, without the presence of a range of options to choose from.
There can in Nagel’s view be values prinnciple, while true or valid, are inadmissible from the point of view of the coercee. This last formulation seems to counsel states to keep autonomt options open in their lawmaking. It is not implausible to think that the availability of some repugnant options just makes the autonomous life harder.
There are thus three, not just two normative realms in a context of toleration. Four Conceptions of Toleration 3. I will suggest that the claim turns on an argument about social meanings and the argument may be difficult to contain in a way that would be necessary to support the harm principle.
Competitive value pluralism will, if unchecked, lead to intolerance and suppression, thereby reducing the number of valuable forms of life available, possibly to the extent that there is an inadequate range from which individuals can choose. In this way Feinberg professes his fidelity to the animating spirit of Mill’s On Liberty. If there is no harm to others and no offence to others to counter, there must be no coercion. Princeton University Press, 28— Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use for details see www.
It has at least the means-ends or practical limits that have just been discussed.